

October 22, 1962

SUBJECT: Information Policy Guidance on Cuba (Output to Cuba)

The President has directed the U. S. Information Agency to use all available resources in making clear our position on the Soviet military build-up in Cuba to the people of Cuba. This instruction is binding on the Voice of America and all other media controlled by the U. S. Government.

OBJECTIVES


- 1. Obtain understanding and support of the Cuban people for the quarantine and any subsequent U. S. actions which may be required.
- 2. Encourage Cuban opposition to and non-cooperation with the Castro regime and the Communists, stopping short of premature or ineffective uprisings.

THEMES IN OUTPUT TO CUBA

Pending further developments, the President's speech provides us with our main guidelines. In cutput to Cuba, we should emphasize:

1. The complete justification of U. S. actions, based on the "unmistakable evidence" of secret Soviet-built offensive nuclear missile

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bases in Cuba, and the grave threat of these bases to all the nations of the hemisphere. (For example, list Latin American targets—in addition to those named by the President—which could be hit with nuclear warheads from these bases.)

- 2. The deceit attempted by the Soviet Government in asserting that the military build-up in Cuba was defensive in nature; therefore the untrustworthiness of the USSR as an ally of Cuba. The Soviet Union's long history of lies, broken promises, deceptions and aggression.
- 3. The Castro regime's latest lie: claiming that Soviet arms were for defense only.
- 4. The sordid history of Castro's sell-out of the revolution to Communism, topped by his turning the island over to the Soviets for use as a base of aggression. Recall Castro's hiding of the Communist nature of his movement until well after he was in power.
- 5. The risk of nuclear destruction to which the Cuban people have been exposed by Castro's sell-out to the USSR and the secret construction of offensive nuclear missile bases.
- 6. The <u>limited</u> nature of the U. S. quarantine. It keeps out arms but not food or medicine. If food shipments to Cuba stop, it will <u>not</u> be because of the quarantine.





- 7. The U. S. wants peace, not war--and particularly has no desire to war on the captive people of Cuba. We have no quarrel with them.

 "only sympathy and hope." Their "lives and lands are being used as pawns by those who deny (them) freedom."
- 8. Why the U. S. has undertaken the quarantine: To protect the hemisphere (including the people of Cuba) from the threat of war and aggression; to give back to the Cuban people "the dream of their own revolution--the dream . . . which Fidel Castro repudiated when he sold (them) out to the Soviets." We do not intend to turn back the clock in Cuba.
- 9. There are only two reasons for the secret Soviet military build-up in Cuba--and both serve the interests of the Soviet Union, not the Cuban people: (a) Aggression and subversion throughout the western hemisphere; (b) subjugation of the Cuban people.
- 10. The difference between U. S. missile bases in Turkey and elsewhere, and the Soviet bases in Cuba. Our bases have not been kept secret and are strictly for defensive purposes, similar to the Soviet bases in Warsaw Pact nations. The secretly-built Soviet bases in Cuba. however, are clearly for offensive purposes and not to defend the USSR which has sufficient strength to protect itself--as Khrushchev has so



often noted--without Cuban bases. (Use this only if hostile comment compares Cuban bases to U. S. bases in other countries.)

Following expected Organization of American States (OAS) endorsement of U. S. actions, we should also emphasize:

- 1. The solidarity of the peoples and governments of the Americas in opposition to Castro Communism in general and the secret Soviet military build-up in particular.
- 2. The legal basis for U. S. actions, deriving from the OAS vote which in turn rests on the 1947 Treaty of Rio de Janeiro.

SPECIAL GUIDANCE

- 1. We should avoid inflammatory comment and overly emotional presentation. We wish to avoid premature uprisings in Cuba which would fail--but at the same time want to encourage passive resistance and non-cooperation.
- 2. We should make full use of responsible opinion, foreign and domestic. in support of our position. Special emphasis should be put on favorable reaction from Latin American personalities with high credibility in Cuba, and on comment from the "nonaligned" countries of Africa and Asia.
- 3. Do not use any comment, regardless of source, which is not wholly consistent with the lines set forth in the President's speech and this instruction.

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